Diploma Programme
Programme du diplôme
Programa del Diploma

International Baccalaureate
Baccalauréat International
Bachillerato Internacional

Markscheme

November 2021

Philosophy

Higher level and standard level

Paper 2

36 pages

International Baccalaureate®
Baccalauréat International
Bachillerato Internacional

I. QIG availability

The following QIGs are usually available for qualification, but this will be confirmed at the start of the marking session:

QIG number	Text/author	English QIG availability	Spanish QIG availability
01	Simone de Beauvoir *The Second Sex*, Vol. 1 part 1, Vol. 2 part 1 and Vol. 2 part 4		
02	René Descartes *Meditations*	✔	✔
03	David Hume *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*		
04	John Stuart Mill *On Liberty*	✔	
05	Friedrich Nietzsche *The Genealogy of Morals*	✔	✔
06	Martha Nussbaum *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach*		
07	Ortega y Gasset *The Origin of Philosophy*		
08	Plato *The Republic*, Books IV–IX	✔	✔
09	Peter Singer *The Life You Can Save*	✔	
10	Charles Taylor *The Ethics of Authenticity*	✔	✔
11	Lao Tzu *Tao Te Ching*		
12	Zhuangzi *Zhuangzi,* Inner Chapters		

II. Candidates who overlook the Paper 2 rubric of answering <u>both</u> parts a and b of <u>one</u> question

However clearly the IB sets out its expectations on how candidates should answer exam questions, there are occasions when we receive work that does not match what we asked for. There is a specific case in exams where we ask students to select particular questions to answer and they fail to follow these rules (rubrics).

This note is intended to clarify how we deal with these situations through a series of scenarios. The actions have been checked to ensure that they are supported by RM Assessor.

Overarching principles

The following statements underpin our decisions below:
1. No candidate should be disadvantaged for following the rules.
2. Whenever possible candidates should receive credit for what they know.

Example

To help understand the different scenarios we will make reference to an example assessment.

Instruction: candidates must respond to both parts of one question.

Q7. (a) Explain Mill's view of the relationship between liberty and utility. (10 marks)

   (b) To what extent are liberty and utility fundamentally conflicting concepts? (15 marks)

Q9. (a) Explain the view that morality has a clear and traceable genealogy. (10 marks)

   (b) To what extent do you agree with the genealogy Nietzsche proposes? (15 marks)

Scenario 1. Candidate answers parts from two different questions.

Example: Candidate answers 7(a) and 9(a) or answers 7(b) and 9(a)

Action:

Mark all of the candidate's answers. The student will receive their best mark from one question.

In the second example this means the best mark for either 7(b) or 9(a).

This requires that examiners assign each mark to the correct question part (ie: gives the mark for 9(a) to 9(a) and **not** 7(a) – if question is QIGed this will happen automatically).

Scenario 2. Candidate does not split their answer according to the sub-parts.

Example: Candidate writes one answer which they label as question 7 or they indicate they have only answered 9(a) but actually answer both 9(a) and 9(b) in that answer.

Action:

Examiners use their best judgement to award marks for all sub-parts as if the candidate has correctly labelled their answer.

In the example this means the candidate would be able to gain up to 25 marks despite only labelling the answer as 9(a).

Exception – where the nature of the two parts of the question means it is important to differentiate between the two answers, for example the first part should be done before the second part (in maths) or the candidate needs to show they understand the difference between the two parts of the question then examiners should use their judgement and only award marks if it is clear that the candidate has simply made a mistake in numbering their answers.

Scenario 3. Candidate duplicates their answer to the first part in the second part.

Example: Candidate answers 7(a) and the repeats the same text as part of 7(b)

Action:

Only give credit for the answer once (in the first part of the question). The assessment criteria should assess distinct skills when there are parts to a question so this problem should not occur.

Scenario 4. Candidate provides the wrong question number for their answer.

Example: Candidate states they are answering 7(a) and 7(b) but their response clearly talks about Nietzsche (Q9) rather than Mill's (Q7).

Action:

Mark the answer according to the markscheme for the question that they should have indicated.

Exception – this only applies when there is no ambiguity as to which question the student has attempted, for example if they have rephrased the question in their opening paragraph. It is not the role of the examiner to identify which question is the best fit for their answer (ie: which questions their answer would get most marks for). If the given question number is a plausible match with their answer then the student should be marked according to that question. Only in exceptional circumstances should this rule be applied to sub-questions (ie: assuming the candidate had mistakenly swapped their answers for Q7(a) and Q7(b).

How to use the Diploma Programme Philosophy markscheme

The assessment markbands constitute the formal tool for marking examination scripts, and in these assessment markbands examiners can see the skills being assessed in the examinations. The markschemes are designed to assist examiners in possible routes taken by candidates in terms of the content of their answers when demonstrating their skills of doing philosophy through their responses. The points listed are not compulsory points, and not necessarily the best possible points. They are a framework to help examiners contextualize the requirements of the question, and to facilitate the application of marks according to the assessment markbands listed on page 8 for part A responses, and page 9 for part B responses.

It is important that examiners understand that the main idea of the course is to promote *doing* philosophy, and this involves activity and engagement throughout a two-year programme, as opposed to emphasizing the chance to display knowledge in a terminal set of examination papers. Even in the examinations, responses should not be assessed on how much candidates *know* as much as how they are able to use their knowledge in support of an argument, using the skills referred to in the various assessment markbands published in the subject guide, reflecting an engagement with philosophical activity throughout the course. As a tool intended to help examiners in assessing responses, the following points should be kept in mind when using a markscheme:

- The Diploma Programme Philosophy course is designed to encourage the skills of *doing* philosophy in the candidates. These skills can be accessed through reading the assessment markbands in the subject guide
- The markscheme does not intend to outline a model/correct answer
- The markscheme has an introductory paragraph which contextualizes the emphasis of the question being asked
- The bullet points below the paragraph are suggested possible points of development that should not be considered a prescriptive list but rather an indicative list where they might appear in the answer
- If there are names of philosophers and references to their work incorporated into the markscheme, this should help to give context for the examiners and does not reflect a requirement that such philosophers and references should appear in an answer: they are possible lines of development.
- Candidates can legitimately select from a wide range of ideas, arguments and concepts in service of the question they are answering, and it is possible that candidates will use material effectively that is *not* mentioned in the markscheme
- Examiners should be aware of the command terms for Philosophy as published on page 54 of the Philosophy subject guide when assessing responses
- In markschemes for Paper 2 there is a greater requirement for specific content as the Paper requires the study of a text by the candidates and the questions set will derive from that text. The markscheme will show what is relevant for both part A and part B answers. In part B responses, candidates may select other material they deem as relevant
- Responses for part A and part B should be assessed using the distinct assessment markbands.

Note to examiners

Candidates at both Higher Level and Standard Level answer **one** question on the prescribed texts.
Each question consists of two parts, and candidates must answer both parts of the question (a and b).

Paper 2 part A markbands

Marks	Level descriptor
0	The work does not reach a standard described by the descriptors below.
1–2	• There is little relevant knowledge of the specified idea/argument/concept from the text. • The explanation is minimal. • Philosophical vocabulary is not used, or is consistently used inappropriately.
3–4	• Some knowledge of the specified idea/argument/concept from the text is demonstrated but this lacks accuracy, relevance and detail. • The explanation is basic and in need of development. • Philosophical vocabulary is not used, or is consistently used inappropriately.
5–6	• Knowledge of the specified idea/argument/concept from the text is mostly accurate and relevant, but lacking in detail. • There is a satisfactory explanation. • Philosophical vocabulary is used, sometimes appropriately.
7–8	• The response contains accurate and relevant knowledge of the specified idea/argument/concept from the text. • The explanation is clear, although may be in need of further development. • Philosophical vocabulary is mostly used appropriately.
9–10	• The response contains relevant, accurate and detailed knowledge of the specified idea/argument/concept from the text. • The explanation is clear and well developed. • There is appropriate use of philosophical vocabulary throughout the response.

Paper 2 part B markbands

Marks	Level descriptor
0	The work does not reach a standard described by the descriptors below.
1–3	• There is little relevant knowledge of the text. • Philosophical vocabulary is not used, or is consistently used inappropriately. • The response is mostly descriptive with very little analysis. • There is no discussion of alternative interpretations or points of view.
4–6	• Some knowledge of the text is demonstrated but this lacks accuracy and relevance. • Philosophical vocabulary is used, sometimes appropriately. • There is some limited analysis, but the response is more descriptive than analytical. • There is little discussion of alternative interpretations or points of view. • Some of the main points are justified.
7–9	• Knowledge of the text is mostly accurate and relevant. • Philosophical vocabulary is used, sometimes appropriately. • The response contains analysis, but this analysis lacks development. • There is some discussion of alternative interpretations or points of view. • Many of the main points are justified.
10–12	• The response contains accurate and relevant knowledge of the text. • Philosophical vocabulary is mostly used appropriately. • The response contains clear critical analysis. • There is discussion and some assessment of alternative interpretations or points of view. • Most of the main points are justified.
13–15	• The response contains relevant, accurate and detailed knowledge of the text. • There is appropriate use of philosophical vocabulary throughout the response. • The response contains clear and well developed critical analysis. • There is discussion and assessment of alternative interpretations or points of view. • All or nearly all of the main points are justified.

Simone de Beauvoir: *The Second Sex*, **Vol. 1 part 1, Vol. 2 part 1 and Vol. 2 part 4**

1.   (a)   **[10]**

(b)   **[15]**

Removed for copyright reasons

Removed for copyright reasons

2. **(a)** Explain de Beauvoir's idea that woman is not the only *Other* in society. **[10]**

   (b) Evaluate de Beauvoir's idea that woman is not the only *Other* in society. **[15]**

Removed for copyright reasons

René Descartes: *Meditations*

3. (a) **Explain Descartes's thesis that there exists a "substantial union", or a "thorough mixing together of mind and body".**   **[10]**

   (b) **Evaluate Descartes's thesis that there exists a "substantial union", or a "thorough mixing together of mind and body".**   **[15]**

   The question arises from Descartes's attempt to explain the interaction between the mind and body. In the Sixth *Meditation* Descartes states that nature "teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am not only lodged in my body, like a pilot in a vessel, but that I am besides so intimately conjoined, and as it were intermixed with it, that my mind and body compose a certain unity." Descartes's reasoning behind this is that if the relationship between mind and body was simply that of a pilot in command of a vessel, the mind would simply observe when any part of the body was damaged, rather than feeling any pain. He maintains that sensations such as hunger, pain and thirst entail an intermingling of mind and body. The substance distinction that Descartes makes between mind and body would suggest that the mind is indeed entirely separate from the body. Despite this however, Descartes goes to great lengths to suggest that despite their substantial differences, the body and the mind are connected in some way, and the mind does not simply observe the physical processes of the body as if from outside. Descartes's intermingling thesis argues that there exists a "substantial union", a "thorough mixing together of mind and body".

   [Source: *The Method, Meditations, and selections from the Principles of Descartes, tr. from the original texts with a new introductory essay, historical and critical, by John Veitch*, Sixth Edition. Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and sons, 1879.]

   Candidates might explore (part A):
   - The example of the pilot in a vessel
   - Descartes's claim that the soul operates the body just as a pilot operates his vessel
   - Descartes's assertion that a single union permeates his whole body
   - Descartes's central distinction between thinking and non-thinking (or extended) substances
   - The role of causality
   - Interaction of the mind and body
   - The intermingling thesis circumventing the problem of "confused sensations" such as hunger and thirst
   - Descartes's suggestion that the intermingling of the soul and body is something which is better perceived by the senses than the intellect, and therefore is resistant to rational investigation.

   Possible discussion points include (part B):
   - The problem of substance dualism is demonstrating the two substances (mind and body) can interact and how this interaction actually takes place
   - Descartes's solution to this problem is to argue that the soul operates through the pineal gland in the brain but knowledge of the anatomy has improved since Descartes's time
   - If it is in the nature of causality that causes and effects must have a necessary connection, then the interaction of the two distinct substances of the physical and the mental is untenable
   - Descartes avoids the problem of causality by stressing the fact that in times of hunger, thirst and pain, the mind and body are linked by God, as this is necessary for survival
   - With Cartesian dualism there is little explanation of how a mental action can cause a physical action, or how certain physical occurrences can cause mental effects
   - A fundamental problem in Descartes's philosophy is that the extension, as defined by Descartes (ie: something divisible which takes place in a certain place) cannot be a true attribute of the soul (something indivisible, in no particular space)
   - Descartes fails to elaborate on how this intermingling occurs, preferring to leave it as an esoteric process resistant to philosophical enquiry, or else one of the mysteries of God
   - Descartes proposes that the mind and body somehow seamlessly integrate; however, he offers no explanation of how this takes place; an example of him hiding, as it were, behind imperfect knowledge.

4. **(a)** **Explain Descartes's *cogito*.** **[10]**

(b) **Evaluate Descartes's *cogito*.** **[15]**

The question arises from Descartes's Second *Meditation* and his quest for certainty culminating in "I think, I am". Answers may propose that the *cogito* could be regarded either as an inference from "I think" to "I am", or as a non-inferential identity statement as in "I think = I am". Answers may claim that Descartes regards the *cogito* as necessarily true, and as totally foundational to his epistemology, that is, its truth does not depend upon prior assumptions. So, for Descartes, the *cogito* cannot be doubted. Some answers might argue for the *cogito* being a tautology. Answers might rehearse how Descartes arrived at the *cogito* in the Second *Meditation* by giving an outline of the three skeptical arguments of *Meditation* 1 (error, dreaming and "brain in a vat"/ "evil demon"). The concept of one's essence involving existence and the *cogito* being almost an antecedent to existentialism may be explored in some answers. Answers might also identify the *cogito* as a circular argument and even posit that the *cogito* leads to infinite regress and thus the validity of the *cogito* may be questioned. The *cogito* may well be indubitable but it is also empty. It does not establish that a thinking mind exists, but only that two terms are logically related. On this view the *cogito* could not serve as a foundation to the worldly knowledge which Descartes eventually deduced from it. On the other hand, although it remains *a priori*, if it is regarded as a synthetic proposition, then other propositions will follow from it, and it may well serve as a foundation to Descartes's epistemology.

Candidates might explore (part A):
- Descartes's method of doubt to illustrate how he arrives at the *cogito*
- The *cogito* as a syllogism
- Whether the proposition "I think, I am" is dependent on any other proposition
- Whether the *cogito* is indubitable
- The wax example demonstrating Descartes trying to define his identity in terms of observing and understanding the external world
- The *cogito* as a form of tautology
- The *cogito* in undergirding Descartes's *res cogitans* claim
- The *cogito* as a circular argument.

Possible discussion points include (part B):
- Why make the *cogito* the Archimedean point?
- Descartes's mental activities (thought) must remain private to himself until he has proved the existence of other minds but he uses language that implies existence of other minds and a common world; Descartes is therefore not being skeptically consistent
- The "I am" is not an acceptable premise as the word "I" does not describe a datum
- Descartes supposedly doubted everything that could be doubted; however, he does not doubt his memory or consider the implications of so doing
- What we consider "thoughts" may actually be information passing through us therefore we are not the origin of the thought and thus it is not true to say "I think"
- Does the "I" exist when the "I" is not thinking?
- Descartes makes existence conditional upon thinking and states that the proposition is true whenever he thinks it; this raises problems for the unity of consciousness
- The first certainty is the "I" not God.

David Hume: *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*

5.   (a)   **Explain Demea's claim that the *"a priori* argument lets us prove the infinity of God's attributes".**   **[10]**

(b)   **Evaluate Demea's claim that the *"a priori* argument lets us prove the infinity of God's attributes".**   **[15]**

The claim stems from the opening argument of Part 9 of Hume's *Dialogues.* After Cleanthes expressed his doubts on the *a posteriori* argument on cosmogony, as Philo presented it, Demea states that an *a priori* argument "cuts off all doubt and difficulty with a single blow" (Part 9). Demea's standpoint is grounded in the idea that it is impossible to infer the infinity of God from finite effects. The same is true for the unity of God's nature, which cannot be inferred from "observing the works of nature" (Part 9). Candidates might focus on the arguments Demea presents as proofs of the existence of God: the chain or series of causes can be traced back and must present an initial and ultimate cause, because "whatever exists must have a cause or reason for its existence" (Part 9), since "nothing" can never produce anything, and "chance" is a word without a meaning. Candidates might refer to Cleanthes's criticism of Demea's *a priori* argument, based on the fact that the human mind has not to conceive a "necessary existence" of something else for its own existence: humans can conceive something as existent and as non-existent, without being affected in their own existence. Moreover, if a necessary existence has to be conceived, then the material universe could be it. Candidates might highlight the role of contingency of the matter and the form as opposed to the concept of necessity. Responses might discuss Cleanthes's argument on the nature of matter and the nature of God, whose attributes, if not subject to the alteration of the matter as we know it, must be of a very special quality "that we do not know and cannot conceive" (Part 9). Candidates might discuss the differences between inductive and deductive reasoning, or the role of experience in shaping our knowledge and the necessity of empirical demonstration. Responses might also evaluate Cleanthes's objection to the "ultimate cause" argument of Demea: the chain of causes is an arbitrary act of the mind, which unites or separates the parts of a series or of an organic body according to its scope. Finally, candidates might consider Philo's criticism of Demea's *a priori* argument, which holds that the *a priori* argument and inference are not viable reasonings for religion, whereas they are apt for mathematics. Candidates might evaluate Philo's argument by referring to other philosophical theories, eg: Aristotle, Kant, Popper.

[Source: Hume, D. (1779). *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. United Kingdom: Penguin Books, Limited. https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Dialogues_Concerning_Natural_Religion/mlAJAAAAQAAJ? hl=en&gbpv=0.]

Candidates might explore (part A):
- Demea's *a priori* argument
- The infinity of God and the finiteness of nature
- The argument of the chain of causes and the necessity of an ultimate cause
- The meaning of "nothing" and "chance"
- The concept of "necessary existence"
- The concept of contingency
- Cleanthes's argument on the alteration of matter and God's attributes
- Cleanthes's criticism of Demea's argument of the "ultimate cause" as an arbitrary act of the mind
- Philo's reference to mathematics and theology in relation to the *a priori* argument.

Possible discussion points include (part B):
- Whether the *a priori* argument offers proofs for the existence of God
- Pros and cons of the inductive reasoning
- Other philosophical proofs of the existence of God, eg: Anselm's or Descartes's ontological proofs
- Other *a priori* philosophical arguments*,* eg: Kant
- Other models of reasoning, eg: Aristotle's syllogism, Popper's "trial and error"
- Whether the universe can be explained in terms of necessity or contingency
- Whether different disciplines require different reasonings, eg: mathematics *versus* theology
- Whether the causal connection of events is an arbitrary act of the mind
- The role of experience and empirical demonstration in shaping human knowledge, eg: Bacon, Berkeley, Dewey.

6.   **(a)**   **Explain Cleanthes's claim that "religion, however corrupted, is still better than no religion at all".**   **[10]**

   (b)   **Evaluate Cleanthes's claim that "religion, however corrupted, is still better than no religion at all".**   **[15]**

The claim is presented by Cleanthes in Part 12 of Hume's *Dialogues* and invites an analysis of the nature of, and the different kinds of religion. Candidates might explore Cleanthes's claim by exploring the arguments he presents to support it: the role of punishments and rewards, as means to maintain social, political and moral order within the state, is particularly strengthened by religion, which turn them from finite and temporary into infinite and eternal. Candidates might extend Cleanthes's view to other philosophical perspectives, eg: contractarianism, particularly in Hobbes's theory. Responses might consider Philo's objection to Cleanthes's argument, grounded in the idea that "no period of time can be happier or more prosperous than those in which the religious spirit is never honoured or heard of" (Part 12). Responses might mention the role of superstition and explore the consequences of religion transcending its genuine scope – to be a good influence for humans – and posing itself as the final aim. Candidates might evaluate Philo's argument in favour of the present inclinations of mind, which are the real motive for action, as opposed to the far and uncertain rewards promised by religion. Not very differently from the effects of religion, superstition and fanaticism also "have the most pernicious consequences, greatly weakening humans' attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity" (Part 12). Often, as Philo states, there is an evident inconsistency between the zeal and fervour a person practises the religious exercises with and the falsehood and hypocrisy of his/her other acts. Shifting the focus of action to the personal future and eternal salvation encourages selfishness and "eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence" (Part 12). In exploring the differences between true and false religion posed by Philo, candidates might refer to other views, eg: Kierkegaard. Responses might also include an investigation of the role that fear and hope play in religion. Finally, candidates might evaluate Philo's concluding statement: "To be a philosophical skeptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian" (Part 12). Candidates might take into account other philosophical views, eg: Aquinas, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche.

[Source: Hume, D. (1779). *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. United Kingdom: Penguin Books, Limited. https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Dialogues_Concerning_Natural_Religion/mIAJAAAAQAAJ? hl=en&gbpv=0.]

Candidates might explore (part A):
- The role of punishments and rewards in religion
- Utility of religion to maintain social, political, and moral order
- Philo's view of religion as superstition and fanaticism
- Philo's view of the inconsistency of religion
- Religion as a source of hypocrisy
- Religion as a source of selfishness
- The role of the inclinations of mind as the real motives for action
- Differences between true and false religion
- The role of skepticism for a true believing Christian.

Possible discussion points include (part B):
- Whether immediate awards or punishments have a stronger effect on the human behaviour than awards or punishments in the afterlife
- Whether religion as a tool for social order produces more pros or more cons
- Other philosophical views based on the necessity of punishment and control for maintaining the social order, eg: contractarianism, Hobbes, Bentham's *Panopticon*
- Whether a society requires fear as a means to maintain social order
- Whether religious practices, as personal and intimated experiences, show inconsistency with regard to social behaviour, eg: Kierkegaard
- Whether the shift to a focus on the afterlife produces a general disinterest in social behaviour, charity, and benevolence, eg: Nietzsche
- Whether it is possible to distinguish a personal or true religion and a public or false one, eg: Seneca, Kierkegaard
- The role of casuistry in religion
- Whether egotism is a natural inclination of humans, eg: Rée, Churchland
- Whether sympathy requires a religious framework, eg: Aristotle, Nussbaum
- Whether skepticism is compatible with Christianity or, in general, religious belief.

John Stuart Mill: *On Liberty*

7. **(a)** **Explain the role of belief in Mill's views on protecting free discussion.** **[10]**

(b) **Evaluate the role of belief in Mill's views on protecting free discussion.** **[15]**

The question invites answers that will draw upon the whole of Mill's *On Liberty* although specifically Chapter 2 will inevitably be the main focus of attention. Mill appears to argue if people hold a belief and do not recognize the whys and wherefores for this belief, then, this is not a satisfactory way to hold that belief. Even if the belief is true Mill posits that it is still thought of as being prejudicial. Mill argues the belief consequently loses its meaning and it will be regarded as a "dead dogma" rather than an existing truth. Indeed. for Mill these beliefs will also be damaged by the fact that their adherents will not be able to protect them since they might not even discern the real meaning of these beliefs. So, as Mill claimed, "not only the grounds of the opinion are forgotten in the absence of discussion, but too often the meaning of the opinion itself". Further, according to Mill, a belief has to be verified and only with free discussion is this possible. The role of justification is indispensable in order to verify one's beliefs because for Mill a justified true belief is a belief that is necessary, since it is frequently open to attempted negation and disapproval. Mill emphasised that the importance of the justification of beliefs can only be achieved through free discussion. Answers might advance the argument that Mill considers the challenge of the prevalent opinion so important that he is ready to formulate simulated beliefs to challenge the prevailing ones. "So essential is this discipline to a real understanding of moral and human subjects, that if opponents of all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and supply them with the strongest arguments which the most skilful devil's advocate can conjure up". The assertion by Mill that each individual sees the world in their own way since they come in contact with different parts of it; "his party, his sect, his church, his class of society" (Chapter 2).

[Source: *On Liberty* by John Stuart Mill, Publication date 1867
http://books.google.com/books?id=jUu6GjuSzOEC&hl=&source=gbs_api.]

Candidates might explore (part A):
- Mill's understanding of a justified true belief and the role of justification itself
- The dead dogma argument because truths need to be protected
- The infallibility argument
- How arguments may complement each other
- Mill's appeal to the free market of ideas
- The parallels between Mill's arguments and the dialectics of Socrates
- The importance for Mill of literally hearing and understanding both sides of an idea or an opinion
- Individuals' immediate context in the world.

Possible discussion points include (part B):
- Discussion for Mill can only achieve its goal if people focus on the content of ideas rather than the way they are delivered; people therefore need to separate what is said from the way it is said since not everybody can articulate their beliefs in the same way
- Suppression need not assume infallibility as Mill contended that deciding for others without them hearing both sides is tantamount to an assumption of infallibility
- Mill's claim that free discussion of a belief is important because the belief is strengthened and people become even more passionate supporters
- An informed public is the decisive arbitrator and this therefore assumes that free discussion is of paramount importance
- However, one objection against Mill's view on protecting free discussion is that there are certain beliefs and opinions that if allowed to be discussed might result in negative or harmful consequences
- Another objection is about the content of some beliefs; Mill mentions a range of subjects including theoretical and practical matters, moral and political issues and so it could be argued that the notion of truth cannot be applied in some of these issues for example moral issues cannot be totally false or true as they are intrinsically subjective
- Utilitarian basis for suppression
- The Harm Principle's application in examples such as those Mill identified, like angry crowds and the possibility of physical harm being done.

8. **(a)** **Explain Mill's Harm Principle.** **[10]**

(b) **Evaluate Mill's Harm Principle.** **[15]**

The question invites answers to the question in terms of Mill's belief concerning the utmost importance of complete freedom for human nature and self-development. Mill stated "that society must not interfere in self-regarding concerns of individuals, unless their actions cause harm to others". Answers might consider such antecedents as Bentham's approach which failed to consider the effects of one's actions on others and consequently Mill's Harm Principle countered Bentham and thus made utilitarianism more ethical. Mill argued that the "act of offence does not constitute harm". Mill also claimed that specific actions which may be harmless in private should be banned in public. However, this is somewhat contradictory to Mill's earlier explanation that solely offensive acts do not validate prohibition as the only harm done by a public act which is harmless in private is offence. Answers might also point out that Mill's Harm Principle is crucial to the principles within *On Liberty*, although this viewpoint might be considered inconsistent. Mill's point about individuals being sovereign over their own minds and bodies may emerge in answers. Answers might also identify some of Mill's own supporting examples such as fornication in public being offensive to public decency, the unsafe bridge and slavery etc. Answers might highlight difficulties in what precisely is meant by Mill's use of the term "harm". Mill is clear that offence does not constitute harm and neither do financial catastrophes brought about by the operation of fair competition. Answers may develop some engagement with Mill's assertion that an individual "…cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise".

[Source: *On Liberty* by John Stuart Mill, Publication date 1867
http://books.google.com/books?id=jUu6GjuSzOEC&hl=&source=gbs_api.]

Candidates might explore (part A):
- Mill's Harm Principle is the central idea on which the feasibility of his theory of liberty is based
- What is meant by "harm"
- The only actions that can be prevented are ones that create harm including actions that a person may do that would harm the individual themselves
- The Harm Principle is derived from another principle, the principle of utility
- Mill's distinction between harm and offence
- The legitimacy of the government's interference in individual action
- Mill's identification of exceptional cases involving barbarian nations and "those not of maturity of faculties" (children and idiots)
- The difference between self-regarding and other-regarding acts.

Possible discussion points include (part B):
- Harm needs clarification when it comes to harm other than physical harm for example mental harm
- The difficulty in allowing an individual to act only in such a way that their actions will not harm others, and to prevent them from acting only when their action will harm others, eg: suicide
- The problem that each human society undergoes transformation of ideas and customs over extended periods of time and thus context and culture norms fluctuate
- Mill recognises that "no person is an entirely isolated being" and consequently can self-regarding and other-regarding actions always be identified?
- If the Harm Principle is not applied in cases such as incestuous relationships etc, would the result be a chasm between morality and the law?
- Is Mill's approach inconsistent as illustrated with his treatment of voluntary slavery where the issue might be one of liberty being used to deny liberty?
- The potential clash between two absolute principles on the one hand "utility" and on the other "harm"
- The claim that a major issue with applying the Harm Principle is that an act may not be harmful, however it may be wrong, and therefore Mill's doctrine can be applied to "harmless" wrongs to avert the creation of a community/society which may feel threatened in some way.

Friedrich Nietzsche: *The Genealogy of Morals*

9.   (a)   **Explain Nietzsche's view of *ressentiment* as the hostility that the slaves had for the masters*.***   **[10]**

(b)   **Evaluate Nietzsche's view of *ressentiment* as the hostility that the slaves had for the masters*.***   **[15]**

The question invites an explanation of how and why the slaves feel impotent compared to the masters. This idea is central to Nietzsche's explanation of the origins of morals. In his account the slaves are seen as underlings to their Roman masters and consequently resent the lack of status they have in the social system. The hostility is contained by enslavement and hence becomes expressed through moral conduct. It can be seen as an act of revenge which is against the basic tenets of Christianity, thus the slaves repress their feelings of revenge. The consequence for the master is that they perceive themselves as evil and reprehensible. The result is that the slave morality wins through the clash of values. The masters' hate and their bad actions are expressed openly whereas the slaves, with similar feelings, internalise the experience and feel guilt, punishing themselves which results in the experience of *ressentiment*. *Ressentiment* is presented as both a historical phenomenon and an ever-present psychological state. Nietzsche attributes the origins of good and bad to the master-slave relationship. Good being equated to strong, intellectual and noble whereas bad is seen as weak, low minded and a tendency to follow rather than lead. Essentially for Nietzsche's *ressentiment* is the origin of morality; self-guilt and self-punishment. Like the slave, society has become sick with remorsefulness.

Candidates might explore (part A):
• Whether the utility of actions as being a "will to power" has a purpose
• Differing historical perspectives of the relationship of slave and master
• Slave ideals being created out of resentfulness, misery and frustration
• The link between *ressentiment* and bad conscience
• The role of guilt and punishment
• "Microaggression" - the idea of slighting and belittling all who are not like you, a possible 21st century phenomena expressing power over some one
• The ascetic ideal
• The priest as the ideal representation of the slave.

Possible discussion points include (part B):
• The existence of *ressentiment* might produce repressed aggression which can be seen as an unhealthy psychological state
• *Ressentiment* as an emotion of weakness that typically (though not perhaps necessarily) expresses itself obliquely and deviously, that usually doesn't vent itself at once, but simmers and stews and festers
• Links to Freud and repressed behaviour in children might lead to adult neurosis
• Whether the notion of *ressentiment* is restricted to Christianity or applicable to all religions. The role of the Jewish tradition in the origins of Christianity and in the origins of Nietzsche's view of morality
• Nietzsche's possible anti-Semitic views
• The effect our own biases have on the way we interpret Nietzsche's views
• The perception that the Christian tradition has reoriented good and bad within human society
• The relationship of *ressentiment* to punishment and removal of revenge from the individual's hand "it is the man of *ressentiment* who has the invention of bad conscience on his conscience" (Guy Elgat, *Nietzsche's Psychology of Ressentiment: Revenge and Justice in "On the Genealogy of Morals"*, Routledge, 2017, p. 9).
• Is *ressentiment* a natural reaction to suffering?
• Is *ressentiment* related to a hierarchical society where the "have not" suffers and has *ressentiment*?
• Is *ressentiment* merely righteous anger?

10. (a) **Explain Nietzsche's view of the relationship between science and the ascetic ideal.** [10]

(b) **Evaluate Nietzsche's view of the relationship between science and the ascetic ideal.** [15]

This question seeks an explanation of Nietzsche's science and its interaction with the ascetic ideal as expressed in his second and the third essays. The ascetic ideal is for Nietzsche a means of interpreting everything. It seems that the aim of the ascetic is to will nothingness rather than "will to power". The modern scientist is a person who is dedicated and self-sacrificing in the search for truth. This perception of the scientist might not be dissimilar to the same perception as the priest. The analysis of sense data limits our understanding, and science now seeks a truth beyond the illusion of our senses, and one that rests in mathematics and reason. Science seems now to be more concerned with "being" rather than "becoming" and this is contrary to Nietzsche's idea of a "will to power", a will to "becoming". In science it would seem that there is a lack of value in that it rests on facts but Nietzsche sees science, and increasingly modern science as akin to a new religion in that it uses and relies on a faith. This is a new faith not one based on a god but on reason, and a new ascetic ideal as it interprets the facts. Modern science has its own values so it cannot be against the ascetic ideal as Nietzsche would like. For Nietzsche God might have been replaced by an absolute truth, scientific truth, that tries to explain existence, or "being".

Candidates might explore (part A):
- The nature of values in science
- The ascetic ideal and its relation to the third area of concern for Nietzsche – philosophy, as well as science and secular morals
- Science as the servant of values; what values?
- The nature of science's will to truth
- The methods of interpretation that are employed by the scientist
- Science is not opposed to religion but has become its own religion.

Possible discussion points include (part B):
- Nietzsche's perspectivism, far from dooming the scientific enterprise, energizes it
- The degree to which science is opposed to the ascetic ideal in that both might seek truth, but a different truth
- The degree to which Nietzsche foresaw the new role of science in the 20th and 21st centuries
- Science as a new religion. Can science be seen as a religion? eg: scientism, Taylor's instrumental reason
- Is science as absolute as Nietzsche might suggest?
- Science as an ascetic ideal in that it seeks a meaning to life
- The degree to which science should only seek facts
- The nature of perspectivism
- The degree to which theories of science present degrees of certainty
- The degree to which science relies on an absolute and metaphysical truth
- The relationship of reason and faith in a search for truth.

Martha Nussbaum: *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach*

11. (a) **Explain Nussbaum's use of Vasanti's story.**   [10]

     (b) **Evaluate Nussbaum's use of Vasanti's story.**   [15]

Removed for copyright reasons

12. **(a)** **Explain the role of Aristotelian thought in Nussbaum's capabilities approach.** **[10]**

    (b) **Evaluate the role of Aristotelian thought in Nussbaum's capabilities approach.** **[15]**

Removed for copyright reasons

Ortega y Gasset: *The Origins of Philosophy*

13.   (a)   **Explain Ortega y Gasset's claim that "language is something not created by the individual but something that is found by him".**   **[10]**

      (b)   **Evaluate Ortega y Gasset's claim that "language is something not created by the individual but something that is found by him".**   **[15]**

The claim is from Chapter 5, entitled "The Authentic Name" and invites an analysis of Ortega y Gasset's view of language. According to the Spanish philosopher, language has a social origin and the individual learns it according to the place where he lives. Candidates might discuss the fact that "the words of a language have their meaning imposed by collective usage" (Chapter 5). Responses might explain the differences between speech in the common usage and the denomination made by an individual. Hence, candidates might pinpoint the role of the analogy. In this sense, the creation of a terminology through a metaphorical operation is a poetic process. Responses might refer to Parmenides and the concept of *aletheia* as the original name of philosophy: "*Aletheia…* presents philosophy for what it is – an endeavour at discovery and at deciphering enigmas" (Chapter 5). Candidates might explore the concept of truth, to be intended not as a static entity, but as an action, whose aim is to uncover reality and reach the inner or naked part of us. So, poetry seems to be an authentic way to express what we feel without the ability to say it. Responses might discuss the shift from the original word *aletheia* for naming philosophy and consider how the role of the philosopher has turned into a public figure. Candidates might extend their analyses to other philosophical perspectives, eg: the concept of truth in Plato, the role of senses in Descartes, the limits of language in Wittgenstein, the concept of *epoché* as in Husserl, the concepts of truth and reality from non-western traditions as in the *Tao.*

Candidates might explore (part A):
- The origin and function of language
- The role of words
- The origin of philosophy as *aletheia*
- The roles of Parmenides and Heraclitus
- The concept of truth as action, inquiry, discovery
- The social filter that limits the discovery of truth
- The role of analogy and metaphor
- The role of poetry
- Expression of authentic and inner sentiments
- The public figure of the philosopher.

Possible discussion points include (part B):
- Whether language has an institutional, conventional nature, eg: Searle
- Whether the limits of language are the limits of the world we know, eg: Wittgenstein
- Whether truth is to be intended in terms of action or otherwise, eg: *wu wei* in the *Tao,* or as reference to Plato's Forms
- Whether the discovery of the truth has moral implications, eg: to do the good depends on the knowledge of the good (Augustine)
- Whether language can be intended as one of the other social uses, eg: greeting, that Ortega y Gasset describes elsewhere
- Whether the fact that truth is the aim of *aletheia* means we cannot trust our senses, eg: Descartes
- Whether the idea of truth as linked to *aletheia* means that we have to make use of the concept of *epoché*, eg: Husserl.

14. **(a)** **Explain Ortega y Gasset's claim "that at any given moment we are in possession of only a limited number of cumulative views of reality".** **[10]**

(b) **Evaluate Ortega y Gasset's claim "that at any given moment we are in possession of only a limited number of cumulative views of reality".** **[15]**

The claim is presented by Ortega y Gasset in Chapter 2 of his book and invites an analysis of one or more concepts linked to the process of perceiving and knowing reality. Candidates might start with a mention of Ortega y Gasset's example of the wall (Chapter 2): as long as we look at a wall, each time we will discover new aspects of it, despite the wall having not changed, nor moved. Candidates might refer to the fact that our perception grasps new elements at each observation of things, as if things reveal something new. Candidates might also mention another example presented by Ortega y Gasset: the perception of an orange and the fact that we have to combine different aspects of it through the different views we derive from it in order to have a full knowledge of it, despite the fact that we cannot see it all at once. Responses might discuss the concept of "aspect" and the peculiar relationship it is grounded in: the aspect is something pertaining to the thing and, at the same time, requiring an observer, and so the aspect is the part of the thing grasped from a given point of view. Hence, responses might explain that "these aspects pertain to the thing and are not 'subjective.' On the other hand… they are not the thing itself, but only its 'aspects'" (Chapter 2). The view that the observer grasps is what is commonly called "idea". Candidates might evaluate Ortega y Gasset's criticism of the word "idea" and its ambiguity due to its connection to psychology. Responses might also include an analysis of Plato's theory of Forms. Candidates might explore what knowledge is by comparing and contrasting the different views presented by Ortega y Gasset or others: eg: knowledge of the thing itself, knowledge of a copy of the thing, or an interpretation based on perspective. According to this view, candidates might discuss the concept of truth and reality and whether they are also the result of a perspective or otherwise.

Candidates might explore (part A):
- The fact that observation and perception are not static
- The example of the wall; the example of the orange
- The concept of "aspect"
- Perception and entirety
- Relationship between the thing and the observer
- Knowledge as interpretation
- The concept of "idea"
- The concepts of truth and reality.

Possible discussion points include (part B):
- Whether observation is an active process
- Whether the observer modifies observation itself
- Whether the fact that the aspects pertain to the thing implies a metaphysical or a psychological standpoint
- Whether the concept of "idea" is ambiguous
- Whether Plato's theory of Forms is related
- Broader views about perception and ideas, eg: Locke, Berkeley
- Primary and secondary qualities, eg: Locke
- Whether the conception of knowledge as interpretation means falling into subjectivism, or even solipsism
- Other possible views of the concept of "idea", eg: Descartes
- The role of interpretation in other philosophical views, eg: Bacon, Gadamer, Ricoeur
- Alternative views on the relationship between truth and reality, eg: Aristotle, Heidegger, or subject to interpretation, eg: Rorty.

Plato: *The Republic*, Books IV–IX

15. **(a) Explain the relationship between the Forms and the world of objective reality.   [10]**

    (b) Evaluate the relationship between the Forms and the world of objective reality.   [15]

The question invites an explanation of this central and classical Platonic issue from the angle of the possible content of the ideas. In the *Republic* epistemology and metaphysics are integrated into one main theoretical approach. In this sense it has been sustained that this distinction is actually post Plato, since Descartes onwards. Since the kind of mode of cognition one can have of an object corresponds to the kind of reality or being of it, the questions of knowledge are interwoven with questions of reality. Accordingly, the levels of understanding require corresponding levels of reality in the objects of understanding. The similes of the Divided Line and the Cave have been understood by many interpreters in this sense: the four types of cognition singled out a) conjecture (e*ikasía*), b) belief (*pístis*), c) intellection (*díanoia*), and d) knowledge (*nous*) correspond to four different sorts of objects a) shadows, images, etc, b) animals, artefacts, c) mathematical objects, and d) Forms, particularly the Form of the Good. Knowledge is orientated towards higher forms of cognition and towards objects higher degrees of reality. One way by which Socrates defines Forms is by contrasting with non-Forms. Qualities such as justice and injustice, good and bad are "itself" a single object, but, by showing themselves everywhere in a community with actions, bodies, and one another, each looks like many (476a). This might be seen in relation to our perception of reality, or as suggesting the objective reality of the ideas. Further, "objective reality" might be seen in relation to our actions. Socrates describes the Form of the Good as greater than justice (504d) and claims that "it is by availing oneself of [the Form of the Good] along with just things and the rest, that they become useful and beneficial" (505a).

[Source: Oxford World's Classics: Plato: *Republic*, Robin Waterfield (ed.) © Oxford University Press.]

Candidates might explore (part A):
- The ground distinction between the perceptible and intelligible
- The ordinary experience, based on perceptions, cannot lead to knowledge
- Moments of the argument that knowledge must have Forms for its objects: knowledge is knowledge of what is, while ignorance is attached to what is not (476e–477a); opinion lies between knowledge and ignorance (478c); opinion depends on whatever lies between what is and what is not (478d–e); the Form of something is the object of knowledge, whereas particular things are objects of opinion (479d-e)
- Reality as the object of knowledge, perceived by the rational part of the soul
- Characteristics of the Forms (476b): a) the Form of something is the only one of its kind; b) the Form of something is the pure exemplar of the property of the case; c) individual things, actions, bodies, shapes, manufactured objects of the Form of each of them, but none of them is the Form
- The superiority of the knowledge of the Forms against the knowledge of particulars
- The simile of the Sun (507c–509b): Forms stand opposed to the objects of human sight; this opposition between the visible and the intelligible suggests a resemblance between the sun and some corresponding entity in the domain of the intellect (Form of the Good).

Possible discussion points include (part B):
- The extent to which Plato sustains that each level of cognition has an exact corresponding level of reality
- Socrates's characterization of philosophy in terms of the superior objects of its inquiry: the appeal to the superiority of the Forms (475e–476d)
- Aristotle's criticism of the alleged Platonic realism of the ideas
- The theory of Forms as the origin of a historically variable set of several related issues involving logical, epistemological and metaphysical questions under the heading of the problem of universals, eg: the relation between cognition of universal and singular items

- Contemporary philosophical theories in relation to the theory of Forms: Popper's World 3, Bolzano's theory of a universe of statements in themselves and truths in themselves, Frege's universe of objective contents of thought
- The theory of Forms as the attempt to provide humans with ultimate explanations by appealing to essences
- Platonism as the view that there exist such things as abstract objects, contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of mathematics, eg: discussions in Russell, Gödel and Quine.

16. (a) Explain the relationship between the nature of the Good and the soul.   **[10]**

(b) Evaluate the relationship between the nature of the Good and the soul.   **[15]**

The aim of this question is to offer the opportunity for candidates to explain and evaluate a central Platonic issue as reflected in Socrates´s contention, that although it is very difficult for us to apprehend the true nature of the good, it is that which every soul pursues and for its sake that it does all that it does (*Republic* 505e). It presents the tension between the good which would be universal and overarching by nature and the limitations of the soul to plainly conceive it and act accordingly. The central role of the good is reflected in many ways, eg: "When it comes to the Good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here" (505d). Further, this tension might be also seen reflected in the multifaceted account of desire affirmed in the partitioning of the soul. Precisely, the different parts of the soul and the possible conflict between them are referred to as a problem: "since there are three elements" (436a) do we conduct our actions following each part separately or we do it "with the same part of ourselves" (436a)? Accordingly, the Good might be seen as the unifying factor of our actions. The knowledge of this Form allows us to think coherently about moral issues, and to plan a moral pattern for human life (505a–b). Without this unifying central factor "the virtues of a soul lose their relevance, amounting to no more than "habits and exercises" (518d). Accordingly, the question opens to central routes towards: the Good and the soul. Answers might explore the central issues present in the text: the theory of Forms, the responsibility of the philosopher rulers, how the Good illuminates all knowledge and orientates all other Forms, the simile of the Sun and Cave, and the characterization of the Good from these figures.

[Source: Oxford World's Classics: Plato: *Republic*, Robin Waterfield (ed.) © Oxford University Press.]

Candidates might explore (part A):

- Parts of the soul: desire (*epithumía*), spirit (*thumós*), and reason (*logistikós*)
- Conflict in the soul implies different parts that are opposed to each other
- The distinction of the Good from the pleasures
- The states: pain, pleasure, and the intermediate repose that contains neither (583c)
- Socrates's assertions that no one desires bad things, or that no one errs willingly
- In the *Republic* the Good is not only a politically and morally grounded concept, but is also metaphysical and ontological.

Possible discussion points include (part B):

- The view that the soul is a composite, and thus some desires would not be for the Good's sake
- The true nature of desire would be such as to align every human with the real, not merely the apparent, good
- The extent to which the desire for the Good is a proper motivational power
- The parts of the soul might be seen as agents within the soul, and consequently some actions would aim at the satisfaction of appetite, with no regard whatever for the agent's overall good
- Plato associates the pursuit of the Good with every soul's actions, though not with every desire of every soul
- Appetitive forces might originate independently of reasoning, but they do not remain simple and simultaneously function as motives to action; they have to be integrated into a unified action
- Comparison and contrast with other views and models of the soul from Aristotle to the present day, including non-western views
- Plato's account of the soul and Freud's tripartite conception of *Id*, *Ego* and *Super Ego*.

Singer: *The Life You Can Save*

17. **(a)** **Explain Singer's claim that those who are financially comfortable should give five percent of their annual income.** **[10]**

(b) **Evaluate Singer's claim that those who are financially comfortable should give five percent of their annual income.** **[15]**

Singer makes this claim in order to provide a realistic goal for people. He says that his basic argument leads to conclusions which cut "so strongly against the grain of human nature" that they risk no one following them (Chapter 10). As a result, he proposes that it would be realistic to make this smaller demand: that financially comfortable people give 5 percent of their annual income. Singer points out that this requires justification, since "this standard falls far short of the moral argument I put forward earlier" (Chapter 10). He makes the case by exploring why "what the individual ought to do, and what the best moral rule directs us to do, are not necessarily identical" (Chapter 10). Singer discusses how we use blame and praise to talk about good and bad moral behaviour, rather than living by moral laws. He contrasts his view to Kantian ethics and Rawls's theory of justice. Singer draws on the overall good generated by the view that people should give 5 percent of their annual income: this amount is not onerous and will not affect someone's lifestyle, it is also an amount which many people, not just those who feel willing to make large sacrifices, will make. Overall, this means that it is an amount which is likely to bring about the greatest good.

[Source: © Peter Singer, https://www.thelifeyoucansave.org/the-book/.]

Candidates might explore (part A):
- The psychology of giving and the factors which encourage and discourage people from donating
- How much is needed to save a life
- Arguments against giving as outlined in Chapter 3: "Common Objections to Giving"
- The view that Singer's basic argument suggests something that goes against the grain of human nature
- The view that "what the individual ought to do, and what the best moral rule directs us to do are not identical"
- The view that the 5 percent guideline would overall bring about the best consequences.

Possible discussion points include (part B):
- Whether it is better for a few people to meet the high moral standard implied by Singer's ethical argument, or for everyone to contribute a little even if they could be doing more
- Analogies such as whether this sort of thinking might help with the climate crisis
- An assessment of Singer's view in light of duty-based ethics such as Kantian deontology
- Whether taking a virtue ethics approach might be a better way to justify allowing people to give less than they could, and less than they should if they took the basic argument seriously
- A discussion of the morality of donating less than you could, particularly for very wealthy individuals
- A discussion about fairness and social justice, which might take into consideration questions about equality
- The subjective and cultural nature of Singer's idea of being "financially comfortable"
- Sen's view that we should consider "marginal utility"
- The difference between individual contributions and contributions made by organisations or the state
- Whether Singer makes realistic proposals.

18. **(a)** **Explain Singer's view that there are times when our obligation to others is equal to or greater than our obligation to our own family.** **[10]**

(b) **Evaluate Singer's view that there are times when our obligation to others is equal or greater than our obligation to our own family.** **[15]**

Singer begins Chapter 8 with the story of "the unnatural mother". In this story, Esther Greenwood notices that her village is in danger from a dam giving way. She is forced to choose between warning the villagers and saving her daughter. She "saves the villagers, returns for her child, but drowns in the attempt, although her child fortunately survives" (Chapter 8). This story is used to contrast the idea that we have special duties to our own children with the idea that it is better to save a whole village than ones' own child. Singer draws on other examples to make a similar point. On the other hand, Singer cites Judith Jarvis Thomson who says that a parent who prioritises other children is a defective parent, and uses the story of "the good German" to point out that we are prone to excuse people's immoral actions if they are protecting their own child. Singer concludes that "no principle of obligation is going to be widely accepted unless it recognises that parents will and should love their own children more than the children of strangers, and, for that reason, will meet the basic needs of their children before they meet the needs of strangers" (Chapter 8).

[Source: © Peter Singer, https://www.thelifeyoucansave.org/the-book/.]

Candidates might explore (part A):
- The example of "the unnatural mother"
- The case of Zell Kravinsky who gives away his kidney despite his wife's objections that one day his own child might need it
- The case of Paul Farmer who sacrifices time with his family to help others through an aid organisation
- The story of the "the good German"
- The view that people should not give so much that it effects their own quality of life
- Limits of the preference we are able to show towards our own family.

Possible discussion points include (part B):
- Judith Jarvis Thomson's view that "a father who says, 'I'm no more concerned about my children's lives than about anybody else's life', is just flatly a defective parent; he's deficient in a view that parents ought to have, whether it maximises utility or not" (Chapter 8).
- Whether Singer's conclusions are plausible given the tension between our duties towards others and our duties towards our children
- Singer concludes that it is still wrong to provide one's own child with luxuries instead of saving others; this raises questions about what counts as a luxury
- Whether Singer provides enough guidance about what is and is not permitted in terms of showing preference towards one's own family
- Whether the promises made during marriage, or the duties we have towards our parents hold any weight in the face of saving many lives
- Discussions about how realistic Singer's conclusions are given what we know about human nature
- Egoism *versus* altruism
- Other approaches to balancing duties towards children, and other ethical imperatives, eg: Kantian ethics, Ross's account of *prima facie* duties, virtue ethics approaches which avoid reference to duties or consequences, Jonas's principle of responsibility towards future generations.

Charles Taylor: *The Ethics of Authenticity*

19.   (a)   Explain Taylor's notion of self-determining freedom.   [10]

(b)   Evaluate Taylor's notion of self-determining freedom.   [15]

The question is focused on this central column of Taylor's argument: self-determining freedom. According to him, self-determining freedom is the idea that I am free when I decide for myself what concerns me, rather than being shaped by external influences. It is a standard of freedom that obviously goes beyond what has been called negative liberty, where I am free to do what I want without interference by others because that is compatible with my being shaped and influenced by society and its laws of conformity. Self-determining freedom demands that I break the hold of all such external impositions, and decide for myself alone. Self-determining freedom can be seen as a continuation and intensification of the development inaugurated by "Saint Augustine, who saw the road to God as passing through our own reflexive awareness of ourselves." (Chapter 3). The idea of self-determining freedom is closely interwoven with authenticity. Authenticity is itself an idea of freedom; it involves my finding the design of my life myself, against the demands of external conformity. In this regard it might also take different values: "Self-determining freedom is in part the default solution of the culture of authenticity, while at the same time it is its bane, since it further intensifies anthropocentrism" (Chapter 6).

[Source: THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY by Charles Taylor, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 1991 by Charles Taylor and the Canadian Broadcasting Company. Used by permission. All rights reserved.]

Candidates might explore (part A):
- There is a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else's. But this gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life, I miss what being human is for me
- Before the late 18th century no one thought that the differences between human beings had this kind of moral significance
- A main source of self-determining freedom: understanding right and wrong was not a matter of dry calculation, but was anchored in our feelings. Morality has, in a sense, a voice within which tells us what is the right thing to do
- The displacement of the moral accent of the inner voice which we have to attain to be true and full human beings
- The contributions of Rousseau, who aided this change when he presented the issue of morality as that of our following a voice of nature within us
- This voice is most often drowned out by the passions induced by our dependence on others, of which the key one is *amour propre* or pride. Our moral salvation comes from recovering authentic moral contact with ourselves
- Self-determining freedom has been an idea of immense power in political life. In Rousseau's work it takes political form, in the notion of a social contract state founded on a "general will".

Possible discussion points include (part B):
- Self-determining freedom as the backbone of the culture of authenticity: being true to myself means being true to my own originality, and that is something only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it, I am also defining myself. I am realizing a potentiality that is properly my own
- The development of the self might become self-deception when it is determined by individualism, the overestimation of instrumental reason and alienation from public life
- The notion of self-determining freedom, pushed to its limit, does not recognise any boundaries; it can easily tip over into the most extreme forms of anthropocentrism
- Anthropocentrism, by abolishing all horizons of significance, threatens us with a loss of meaning and hence a trivialization of our predicament
- Self-deception is attached to subjectivism. The slide to subjectivism, and its blend of authenticity with self-determining freedom, is all too readily open

- Other kinds of loss of freedom, eg: when few will want to participate actively in self-government and participation in the public sphere. The danger of a new form of despotism, which de Tocqueville calls "soft despotism"
- The parallel between the concept of the self and art
- The tension between the individual and society: historical forms and discussion of various approaches, eg: totalitarianism, multicultural views.

20. **(a)** **Explain how Taylor's idea of the self unites individual autonomy with commitment to community.** **[10]**

(b) **Evaluate how Taylor's idea of the self unites individual autonomy with commitment to community.** **[15]**

The question asks for an explanation and evaluation of this central idea of Taylor's stance which integrates the development of individual autonomy with the commitment to community. In Taylor´s conception "artistic creation becomes the paradigm mode in which people can come to self-definition" (Chapter 6). From this perspective I discover myself through my work as an artist, through what I create. Accordingly, "my self-discovery passes through a creation, the making of something original and new. I forge a new artistic language – new way of painting, new metre or form of poetry, new way of writing a novel – and through this and this alone I become what I have it in me to be. Self-discovery requires *poiesis*, making. That will play a crucial role in one of the directions this idea of authenticity has evolved in" (Chapter 6). Further, individual autonomy and commitment to community might even be conceived as the two sides of a previous and central unity which is represented by the interaction between authenticity and the dialogical character of human existence. Taylor's idea contains a response to fragmentation, that is, people increasingly becoming less capable of forming a common purpose and carrying it out. Fragmentation arises when people come to see themselves more and more atomistically, ie: the bonds and common interests with their fellow citizens deteriorate.

Candidates might explore (part A):

- Facets of the notion of the self. Self-fulfillment and authenticity. Development and realization of the self requires both individuality and community
- The revitalization of community might be both expressive of the common life of its members and constitutive of their individuality
- The fragmentation of political life endangers the realization of the self. A fragmented society is one whose members find it harder and harder to identify their political society with a community
- This fragmentation comes about partly through a weakening of the bonds of sympathy, partly in a self-perpetuating way, and through the failure of the democratic initiative itself
- A common theme in many different versions of the fragmentation of political life: the competing demands for recognition of the legitimacy or value of different identities
- Politics of recognition, appearing in nationalism, ethnic politics, feminism and multiculturalism, as an outgrowth of the modern valuation of self and ordinary life
- A presumption of mutual respect is a useful beginning, but also a "mere ought", unless linked to a notion of the self. First, the self as necessarily socially engaged rather than merely observing from an external vantage point. Second, the self as limited in its capacity for understanding by the very cultural frameworks that make its individuality and understanding possible. Third, the self as open to change through communicative interaction.

Possible discussion points include (part B):
- The extent to which the tension between the individual and the community could be properly resolved
- In pure individualistic liberalism there is no resolution to this dilemma because of its homogenizing conception of the person and consequent incapacity to provide a sense of significant differentiation so that partial communities can be centres of value within larger politics in ways that connect members to the whole
- Relation to art; the parallel between the shift in concepts of the self and individualism and the movement in art from mimesis to creation. Art also serves as an example of how the subjectivation of the self does not mean that this subjectivation leads to narcissism and egoism
- A Marxist idea of relating or subsuming the individual into a collective
- The nature of a free society as the locus of a struggle between higher and lower forms of freedom
- Examples of cultural and social variations of democracy and their functioning
- A serious attempt to engage in the cultural struggle of our time requires the promotion of a politics of democratic empowerment, which might strengthen communitarian bonds
- Alternative views of the relationship between individual autonomy and commitment to community, eg: McIntyre and communitarianism.

Lao Tzu: *Tao Te Ching*

21. **(a)** **Explain Lao Tzu's claim that the *Tao* is unknowable.** **[10]**

(b) **Evaluate Lao Tzu's claim that the *Tao* is unknowable.** **[15]**

Removed for copyright reasons

22. (a)

[10]

(b)

[15]

Removed for copyright reasons

Zhuangzi: *Zhuangzi*

23. **(a)** **Explain the idea of Chaos (*Hundun*).** **[10]**

 (b) **Evaluate the idea of Chaos (*Hundun*).** **[15]**

Removed for copyright reasons

24. **(a)**

[10]

   (b)

[15]

Removed for copyright reasons

[10]